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As part of a larger inquiry into the consequences of international migration for those
who remain in the country of origin, detailed interviews were conducted with 234
adults in four Turkish provinces. Three migrant-status categories were defined: (a)
Returned migrants, (b) Non-migrant close kin or friends of migrants, and, as a con-
trol group, (c) All others. Group (a) was the most likely to own various manufac-
tured items, and group (c) the least, with group (b) in between. But when, within
each migrant-status category, those who did not own but wanted a particular item
were added to those who already owned it, much of the difference by migrant-
status disappeared. This was particularly so with regard to "necessities." Controlling
for age, sex, urban-rural residence, and schooling produced an essentially inconsis-
tent pattern of association between these characteristics and owning or wanting a
particular item. It did, however, reveal a widespread persistence of not wanting one
or another of these items side by side with a pattern of wanting it. While owning or
wanting something seemed to receive only limited support from the consumption
patterns of relatives and friends, not wanting something seemed to receive consider-
able support from this source. This seems unlikely to continue, however, in the face
of changes now taking place in Turkey.
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POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
The substantial increase since the mid-seventeenth century in the hu-
man exploitation of natural resources—and its complement, the creation of
wastes—is well known. The Earth's atmosphere, its air, water, and ground
water are more polluted, its soils more degraded. Wildlife habitats have
been lost here, seriously depleted there. And on a massive scale old growth
forests have been cut down, wetlands drained, and crop, forest, and graz-
ing lands lost to urban development, road-building, dam construction, and
home and commercial expansion.
Moreover, the pace of these changes is accelerating—in consequence
of the concurrent operation of the three forces of population increase, tech-
nological and scientific development, and seemingly ever-higher levels of
material aspiration.
Among the results are: losses to biodiversity, depletion of protective
atmospheric ozone, losses of amenity (e.g., natural beauty, open space,
peace and quiet), and global climate change. There are limits—physical,
ecological, social. Human beings have already overshot some (see, e.g.,
Catton, 1980), and they are in process of approaching many others.
Quite apart from attempting actually to halt these developments, any
adjustment to such conditions or amelioration of their more deleterious
consequences will require changes in human behavior; changes, i.e., in
lifestyles, in the application of science and technologies, and in the level of
human reproduction. Although it might seem reasonable to look to further
developments in science and technology for assistance toward attainment
of such goals, science and technology cannot do the job alone. For a task
of this magnitude there are no technological "fixes," no "magic bullets."
The major challenge would appear to be that of achieving the requi-
site changes in consumption. In part, this is because world fertility is finally
on course towards ultimate stabilization at replacement levels, while con-
sumption seems everywhere to be on the increase (and at an accelerating
pace). But there are other, more systemic reasons for expecting consump-
tion to present a particular challenge. For one thing, there is the force of
habit and acquired preferences associated with people's daily lives—and
the persistent patterns of consumption underlying these habits and prefer-
ences. For another, there are the constant and, in many societies, all but
ubiquitous encouragements to the continuation of these patterns of con-
sumption. Some of these encouragements inhere in the existence (and, in
individual instances, possession) of the equipment and infrastructure upon
504
LINCOLN H. DAY AND AHMET ICDUYGU
which this continuation depends (the cars, trucks, and recreational vehi-
cles; the networks of roads; the buildings constructed without reference to
solar principles for heating, lighting, and cooling; clothes driers; room
heaters and coolers; ice makers and refrigerators; power tools; power
boats, non-solar hot water heaters, and so on). Other encouragement
comes from individuals and institutions with a vested interest in widening
the existence and possession of such equipment and infrastructure. A ma-
jor means to this end employed by such interests is advertising—that quint-
essential industry of the growth economy (see the classic statement by
David Potter, 1954, chap. 8)—with its main goal the creation of markets
for an ever-expanding supply of products, and its main means to this goal
the creation of dissatisfaction with what one has and the concurrent dis-
couragement of alternative (i.e., non-advertised) sources of satisfaction.
Underwritten by the latest advances in the technologies of mass communi-
cation, modern advertising is a potent force supporting not just the contin-
uation of present levels of consumption but also their expansion, as well as
diffusion to other populations.
The requisite changes in consumption will necessarily be greatest
where high-consumption practices are most entrenched and widespread;
where, for example: patterns of settlement and land use are based on the
widespread use of the automobile as a means of mass transit; homes and
offices are widely dependent on non-solar sources for heat, light, cooling,
and the movement of material and personnel; and food supplies are highly
dependent on the expenditure of large amounts of energy for production,
processing, and distribution. In short, the changes will be greatest in those
countries—and, if equity is a goal, among those populations within these
countries—most characterized by high resource-consumption lifestyles.
The entrenchment and extensiveness of these lifestyles will merely add to
the difficulty of effecting the changes that are necessary.
But the importance of human numbers cannot be denied. The causal
equation in these processes is human consumption times human numbers.
This interaction has already caused the world to reach or come close to
reaching the limits of the ecological conditions on which all species de-
pend. It is also causing changes to take place in this once stable planet.
The earthquakes, hurricanes, droughts, plagues, crop failures, etc. of the
past never shook the basic physical stability of the planet as a whole. But
the recent concentrations at the extremes—of temperature, rainfall, tidal
levels, for example—plus the destruction of ozone and the build-up of the
likes of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane (See, e.g., Smil, 1991;
or, for a summary more oriented toward the general reader: McKibben,
1989) show, in the words of one observer, "that man's relationship to na-
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ture can no longer be considered a constant, a background factor, some-
thing to be taken for granted. It changes as human activities change, and it
must be monitored and evaluated and thought about just as we think about
social interactions" (Davies, 1998, p. 3).
These significant environmental changes have been accompanied by
equally significant demographic changes. Whatever the encouragement to
be derived from current fertility trends, the force of demographic momen-
tum (i.e., the working out, over time, of present age structures)—barring
some massive high-mortality calamity, of course—will inevitably lead to
far larger populations in the future, both in the world as a whole and in
individual countries (U.N., 1996).
The latter half of the twentieth century has seen not only massive in-
creases in human numbers overall, but especially large movements of hu-
man populations across national boundaries. In both scope and volume,
this is one of the most striking social phenomena of the past one and a half
centuries. But there have been some recent changes in the composition of
such movements. Until recently, they were largely limited, in personnel, to
the people of Europe and, in direction, to the land areas of the New World.
Migration statistics suffer from poor international comparability as to defi-
nitions, coverage, and completeness, but it is generally accepted that, from
the beginning of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, the
traditional immigrant-receiving countries of the New World admitted more
than 60 million people, and that the great majority of these people were
Europeans. Europeans continue to migrate, but recent decades have seen
enormous changes in the overall pattern of migration—changes in magni-
tude, direction, and length of stay abroad. The movement of Europeans,
although it continues to involve some hundreds of thousands annually, is
now only a fraction of the total non-tourist flow of people between coun-
tries; and, numerically, movement out of Europe is more than counter-
balanced by movement into Europe. In but a few decades, people from the
developing countries have moved to center stage. They now constitute the
majority of permanent immigrants to the traditional receiving countries,
and are, as well, the major elements in the flows of other types of migra-
tion. Most of those now living outside their homelands—estimated a
decade ago as already some 20 million contract workers, millions of refu-
gees, hundreds of thousands of transient professional workers, and un-
known numbers (but clearly millions) of illegal workers (Appleyard, 1989,
p. 19)—are non-European.
These more recent (and continuing) movements have been notable for
the large numbers involved, the great variety—demographic, racial, and
cultural—of the participants, and—of particular interest here—the extent
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of the movement from areas of relatively low to areas of relatively high
levels of resource and energy consumption.
Massive as these movements have been, they have had little effect on
population growth in the "less developed" portion of the world. The popu-
lation base in these areas is too large and the fertility level too high. In the
1985-1990 period, emigration reduced the overall growth rate of this part
of the world by only about 2.5 percent, and, in the 1985-1990 period, by
only 2.8 percent (U.N., 1998, p. 50). In the "more developed" region,
however, where net migration had already accounted for more than a quarter
(27%) of the population increase in the 1985-1990 period, it is reckoned
to have accounted for nearly half (45%) of this increase in the 1990-1995
period (United Nations, 1998, p. 50). And this is a minimum estimate; for,
in arriving at these estimates, births to immigrants in the countries of desti-
nation are not counted as part of the population increase resulting from
immigration. If they were, these rates would be markedly higher—given
the generally youthful ages of migrants and the generally higher fertility of
those from the less developed countries (See, e.g., Day, 1983, pp. 78-79).
In France, for example, immigrants accounted for nearly a quarter of all
births registered in 1985, and for more than 40 percent of births in the
1953-1964 baby boom [Tribalat (Ed.), 1991, cited in Termote, 1991, p.
554].
The question posed here is whether these migratory movements have
any significance for the future of consumption. The causes of international
migration can be highly complex; but to the extent a potential migrant has
the choice of whether or not to migrate (and not all have this choice: those
fleeing extreme political or military persecution, for example, and some-
times even the spouses or children of potential migrants), the goal of eco-
nomic betterment would appear in most instances to be an important ele-
ment in the potential migrant's process of decision-making. In fact, the
greater the cultural differences between the countries of origin and destina-
tion, the more prominent is the role played by economic aspirations in any
decision to migrate likely to be.
But whatever their motivation, immigrants could, on the whole, be
expected to encounter more frequently and adopt more readily a host soci-
ety's high resource-consumption patterns than they could that society's
more abstract patterns of thought and behavior relating to, say, legal rights
and obligations, relations between the sexes, or the conservation of its his-
torical, cultural, or environmental heritage. Especially with respect to mate-
rial things, immigration can bring the migrant into contact with new con-
sumer items and the patterns of thought and behavior associated with
them. At the same time it can remove the migrant from agents (such as
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friends and kin, the mass media of the country of origin, and various mate-
rial manifestations—-buildings, houses, urban layouts, landscape) that
might support his or her continued attachment to prior ways and levels of
aspiration. And, of course, any increase in income will enable the migrant
to increase his or her consumption and participation in the new lifestyles,
which, in turn, can reinforce attachment to these new ways and, in some
instances, cause the migrant to become more dependent upon continued
adherence to them. There is also, specifically with ownership, the possi-
bility of one's developing a psychic commitment to what has been pur-
chased, if only because of a desire to avoid having to admit—to oneself or
others—that some purchase (or even the decision to migrate) might have
been unwise or ill-advised.
Thus, immigration can be expected to encourage higher overall con-
sumption levels, and to do so by the degree to which immigrants adopt the
higher resource-consumption patterns of their host societies. And it will
probably have this effect on consumption levels regardless of whether indi-
vidual migrants remain in the host societies or return to their societies of
origin.
But what about those who do not migrate; in particular, those in the
migrants' networks of close kin and close friendship? Will migration affect
their consumption, too? There are a number of ways in which one might
expect it to: through higher levels of aspiration in response to communica-
tion with "successful" migrants; through greater consumption and partici-
pation in new lifestyles made possible by migrants' remittances; through,
because of the existence of these higher incomes, having to take up new
ways or becoming more dependent on continuing to practice these ways
(e.g., becoming more dependent on a car for commuting, shopping, and
recreation because of more extended patterns of settlement in response to
increased—remittance-funded— ownership of cars and the political influ-
ence of those who own them or can profit from building the infrastructure
commensurate with their use).
The consequences of migration, whether within or between countries,
are experienced at three levels: that of the migrants themselves, that of the
society they enter, and that of the society they leave. Although there have
been exceptions (e.g., Abadan-Unat, et al., 1976; Yenisey, 1976; Engel-
brektsson, 1978; Gordon, 1978; Bennett, 1979; McArthur, 1979; Gras-
muck, 1982; Khattab & El Daeif, 1982; Khafagi, 1983; Alpay & Sariaslan,
1984; Azmaz, 1984; Morauta, 1984; Gunatilleke [Ed.], 1992), social re-
searchers have tended to focus on the first two to the exclusion of the third.
Either they have ignored these consequences altogether, or considered
them from but a limited perspective: commonly focusing on internal move-
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ments (usually rural to urban). The scope of inquiry usually excludes the
international, and, more important, is limited to narrowly economic con-
cerns. Moreover, inquiry is at such a high level of generality (the national,
for the most part, and in terms of such issues as the balance of payments,
employment levels, and average wage rates) as to eclipse individual behav-
ior and difference, while addressing issues of mutual causation and con-
text, if at all, only by inference.
The data for the present analysis come from a more general inquiry
into the role played by international migration (particularly that between
markedly different cultures and levels of living) in fostering or retarding
social change in societies of origin. The locus of this study was Turkey, a
particularly appropriate place for such inquiry, firstly, because of its high
rate of emigration, and secondly, because this high rate of emigration is of
but recent origin. Unlike the British, Germans, Italians, Greeks, Chinese, or
Indians, for example, the Turks had no particular history of large-scale em-
igration in modern times until the signing of the bilateral Turkish-West Ger-
man agreement of 31 October 1961, which initially permitted Turkish men
to enter West Germany on temporary 1 -year work contracts and was later
expanded to permit the entry of women and families. In the less than four
decades since, Turkish men and women have emigrated in the hundreds of
thousands. The great majority have gone to Western Europe, but large
numbers have also gone to Australia and, more recently (in larger numbers
than to Australia), to the Arab countries of both North Africa and the Per-
sian Gulf.
The growth of this movement has been impressive. From almost none
in late 1961, there were, by the mid-1990s (when the population of Turkey
itself was some 57 million), more than 2.5 million Turkish workers and
their dependents in Europe, some 170,000 Turkish workers (without depen-
dents—dependents not being allowed in) in Arab countries, and some
40,000 settlers in Australia (Gokdere, 1994, p. 37). Thus, at any one time
during these years, some 5-6% of the Turkish population was abroad. And
when we remember that some 30-40% of these emigrants returned perma-
nently to Turkey, it would appear that a sizable minority of the present
Turkish population has had a direct experience of emigration, and that an
even larger proportion—through the emigration of a close relative or
friend—an indirect experience.
The potential influence of this movement on Turkey is, however, a
function of contacts as well as numbers. From the beginning, Turkish em-
igrants appear to have kept in touch (through letters, telephone calls, and
remittances) to a particularly high degree with family and friends in the
homeland, and through visiting there from time to time on holiday, to at-
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tend weddings, or in response to the sickness or death of a relative (Ic-
duygu, 1994). At the very least, one could expect this combination of mas-
sive emigration and the maintenance of a high level of contact with those
who remained behind to be an important stimulus to change in Turkey's
economic and social life.
Yet, massive as this movement has been, its recency offers the impor-
tant possibility, so far as social research is concerned, of being able to
identify for comparative purposes a control group of persons presumably
but little affected (at least in any direct sense) by the experience of migra-
tion, whether their own or that of close kin or friends. In designing our
inquiry, it was thus possible, on the basis of their experience of interna-
tional migration, to envisage three distinct categories of persons: (a) re-
turned migrants, (b) non-migrants who were close relatives or close friends
of migrants (whether or not these migrants had returned), and, as a control
group, (c) non-migrants who were neither close relatives nor close friends
of migrants.
METHOD OF INQUIRY
Our analysis is based on the results of lengthy, detailed interviews
with adult men and women in four Turkish provinces, ranging from the
more developed and urban (Ankara, Izmir) to the less developed and rural
(Konya, Yozgat). Ankara (city population: 3 million) and Izmir (city popula-
tion: 2 million), two of the main metropolitan areas in Turkey, have been
major sources of migrants to a wide range of receiving countries (from
Germany to Australia, North Africa, and the Gulf States). They are also the
main areas to which migrants have returned. Konya (city population:
550,000), the country's richest grain-growing area, has been a major
source of migrants to several receiving countries, most particularly in Scan-
dinavia. Yozgat (city population: 45,000), an underdeveloped region, has
been a source of emigrants to a variety of countries.
Respondents were drawn in approximately equal numbers from each
of the four provinces and, within each province, in approximately equal
numbers from both urban and rural districts. The respondents were all per-
sons 18 years of age and over (N = 234) in 116 households. The oldest was
74. Eighty-three of them (47 men and 36 women) were returned migrants;
54 (6 men and 48 women) were close relatives of migrants, whether or not
returned; 19 (3 men and 16 women) were close friends of migrants,
whether or not returned; 34 (1 7 men and 17 women) were both close
relatives and close friends of migrants, again whether or not returned; and
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Respondents by Sex and Migrant Status
Migrant Status
Returned migrants
Non-migrants who are close kin or close
friends of migrants
Controls (non-migrants who are neither
























44 (24 men and 20 women) were "controls," that is, neither migrants them-
selves nor close relatives or friends of migrants (for a more detailed discus-
sion of the fieldwork, see Day and Icduygu, 1997). On the basis of a tally
of a selection of their answers, we decided nothing would be lost—and
much gained—in the processing and analysis of the data if we made a
single category out of the three kin or friend categories. The resulting distri-
bution by sex and migrant category is shown in Table 1.
There were seven interviewers, including the Director of Fieldwork
(Icduygu). All were Turkish, and originally from the several districts in
which the interviews were conducted. In addition to interviewing, they
participated in both the construction of the questionnaire and the develop-
ment of indicators used for various of the analyses. The interviews, which
lasted between one and one and a half hours, were conducted in private,
away from others, with men interviewed by men and women by women.
The respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their answers, and
there was no tape-recording of what was said. Such precautions add to the
confidence one can have in the results of such an inquiry and, more specif-
ically in the present instance, can be expected to lessen whatever bias
might inhere in the fact that a fourth of the households in the study con-
tained more than one interviewee. The distribution of interviewees by
household size is presented in Table 2.
LIMITATIONS OF THE INQUIRY
Because we were not dealing with a random sample of the Turkish

































































from saying anything at all—about conditions in Turkey as a whole. This
particular limitation is of no moment here, however, for it was not our
intent to describe Turkish society or identify either the relative magnitudes
of the various sectors of the Turkish population or the types of behavior
among them. Instead, our purpose was to ascertain the association (or lack
of it) between migrant status and various items of behavior, belief, and
attitude—irrespective of the proportionate distribution of these phenomena
within the Turkish population as a whole. There is no dearth of problems
with this type of research: problems of definition, of appropriateness of
questions, of coding, of respondents' understanding of questions or their
mood at time of interview, for instance. But unless there is reason to be-
lieve (and we know of none) that the various items for analysis we have
inquired into are somehow randomly associated with what we have cross-
tabulated them with, the lack of a random sample should be no grounds
for concern.
The number of respondents, however, is another matter. As in any
study of this type, the sample size is the main limitation on the number of
factors that can be simultaneously controlled. The large amount of infor-
mation we have collected makes this a matter of particular significance in
the present instance. Almost any cross-tabulation of these data produces a
plethora of empty cells. We addressed this problem in two ways. Firstly, we
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combined values in the major control categories so as to attain cells with
more workable numbers (Ns): reducing Age to four categories, Migrant Sta-
tus to three, Level of Schooling to five, and Residence to two. Secondly, we
limited our analyses to searching only for general patterns of relationship,
as against employing one or another statistical test of "significance" (for an
earlier use of such an approach, see: Day, 1991). Slight statistical differ-
ences, unless part of such a pattern, were disregarded. Such a course of
action was called for not only by the generally small Ns in the cells created
by our tabulations but also by the fact that these data were not derived
from a random sample.
FINDINGS
Our main data on consumption consist of answers to the following
questions:
a. I'm going to read off a list of manufactured goods. Please tell me which
of these you own or have access to.
b. Are there any of these you don't have that you would especially like to
have? Which ones?
c. Are these [i.e., the things the respondent especially wants] things that
some of your relatives or friends have? Which ones do they have?
d. Did you use any of this money [i.e., money earned as an emigrant or
received as a remittance from an emigrant] to buy things you would
not have been able to buy if you (he/she) had not migrated?
[If YES]
1. What were those things?
2. Do most of your friends (neighbors) also own such things?
3. What things like these don't they own?
4. What about your relatives—Do most of them own such things?
5. What things like these don't they own?
6. Do you think your having these things has made any difference
in your family's relations with its friends, neighbors, or relatives?
At the most general level, what stands out about the relation between
migration and consumption is the consistently lower consumption among
those in the control group: those, that is, who are neither migrants them-
selves nor the close kin or friends of migrants. This is true of both men and
women. Other than with radio and television sets (access to which is all
but universal within the population studied), the controls have the lowest
percentages owning or having access to the manufactured goods specified




tween, but with percentages markedly closer to those of the Migrants, are
the close kin/friends of migrants.
The smallest differences in ownership/access by migrant status and sex
(apart from the ownership of wristwatches, which is limited among non-
migrant women but almost universal among men) relate to such near-
essential household items as refrigerators and washing machines; the larg-
est differences, to the three luxury items: cameras, videos, and cars (Table
3), with each of which ownership is higher among men..
When it comes to the desire for these various items on the part of
those who do not have them, the pattern by migrant status (with one im-
portant exception) lacks the consistency of that respecting owning/access.
But if we combine the percentages who either own or, if they do not have
these items, want them, the differences by migrant status—among both
men and women—are markedly reduced. Particularly is this true of the
near-essentials. Almost every respondent either owns or wants a refrigera-
tor; and were it not for a few women among the Controls, the same could
be said about a washing machine. Moreover, most (71%) of the rural men
in the Control group who do not have a tractor want one, and both of the
remaining 2 migrant women without a wristwatch want one. But with the
TABLE 3
Proportions Owning or Having Access to Selected Manufactured

















































































# Discrepancy due to missing data.
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major luxury items—cameras, videos, and cars—it is different. Although
attenuated by the addition of the "wanters," the pattern already seen with
ownership continues: Migrants express the greatest interest and Controls
the least, with Kin/Friends in between but closer to the Migrants (Table 4).
The one exception—an important one because of the economic, so-
cial, and environmental significance of the item involved—relates to auto-
mobiles. Both car ownership and the desire for a car on the part of those
who do not have one are highly graded according to migrant status. The
sum of those who have a car or want one amounts, respectively for men
and women, to 81 and 80 percent among Migrants, to a much lower 65
and 47 percent among Kin/Friends, and to a still much lower 17 and 15
percent among the Controls. If this indicates a marked increase from the
virtual absence of cars in Turkey on the eve of modern large-scale emigra-
tion (about a 35-fold increase, as it happens) (U.N., 1962, Table 140, and
U.N., 1992, Table 101), it also indicates considerable room, still, for fur-
ther expansion of this especially significant component of the high-energy
consumption society.
So ownership of/access to particular consumer goods varies by mi-
grant status and sex. Does it vary, as well, by urban-rural residence, age, or
TABLE 4
Sum of Proportions Wanting or Owning (or Having Access to)

















































































# Discrepancy due to missing data.
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schooling? Despite the inevitably small Ns entailed, we undertook to find
out—arbitrarily limiting analysis to cells in which N>5. While the general
pattern found with ownership/access—that is, with migrants showing the
highest proportions and Controls the lowest—is found also within both
residence categories and each age and schooling category, the distribution
of the sum of those who have these items and those who want them is
nowhere as distinct in these more detailed tabulations as it is in the more
general ones.
Controlling for migrant status and sex, the differences by residence,
age, and schooling prove to be neither very great nor very consistent. What
differences there are tend generally—but not always—to be: by residence,
in the direction of higher percentages among urban-dwellers; by age, in the
direction of higher percentages at the younger ages; and by schooling, in
the direction of higher percentages at the higher schooling levels (Tables 5-
7). There is no particular pattern of greater proportionate differences
among men than women, nor between the migrant status categories. There
is, however, a tendency for the greater differences to occur in relation to
luxury items as against the near-necessities.
As in the more general analysis (i.e., the one lacking any breakdown
by residence, age, or schooling), the clearest association is with the auto-
mobile. Among both men and women the proportions owning or wanting
a car are consistently highest among Migrants and lowest—usually by a
considerable margin—among the controls. Apart from the kin/friend cate-
gory, where the proportion is substantially higher among men, women
seem quite as caught up (or, especially among the controls, not caught up)
as men in their desire for a car. Within each migrant status grouping, this
desire is, with few exceptions, highest among urban-dwellers, younger re-
spondents, and those with more schooling. A fairly substantial difference
between the sexes exists within the kin/friends category when tabulated by
either residence or age; but when tabulated by schooling, this difference is
much reduced.
And what about the consumption patterns of the respondents' relatives
and friends: might these have some bearing on respondents' propensity to
consume? By definition, those without a particular item have somehow
managed to get along without it—so far. Thus, any change in one's pattern
of consumption or consumer aspirations is likely to rest at least in part on
new experiences one has had or changed perceptions about the consump-
tion patterns of others—either of which could be associated with an expe-
rience of migration (whether direct or indirect). We have already noted that
both the possession and the desire for consumer goods are associated with
migrant status. Is there also, by migrant status, any association between this
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TABLE 5
Sum of Proportions Wanting or Owning (or Having Access to)















































































































































(-) N = 0
desire (or the lack of it) and whether such items are owned by or accessible
to one's kin and friends?
Only a few—most of them returned migrants, and seldom more than
10% within any given category—of those who reported owning or having
access to one or another of the manufactured items specified in this study
also answered in the affirmative when asked whether they had any rela-




respondents are on something of a frontier, essentially on their own, so far
as the consumption of these particular goods is concerned. Among those
respondents who reported not having these items, however, it is a different
matter. If there is any support to be had for a particular pattern of consump-
tion in the fact that that pattern is shared with one's kin or friends, there is
support here for these non-owners both to want a manufactured item they
do not already have and also to not want it. This support is more promi-
nent, however, in the case of nof wanting than in the case of wanting.
Among those wanting a particular item, nearly everyone mentions both
having a kinsman or friend who has it, and also having a kinsman or friend
who does not have it. But among those who say they do not want a partic-
ular item, nearly everyone mentions having a kinsman or friend who, also,
does not have it, and only a few mention having a kinsman or friend who
has it (Table 8, parts b and c). There is no pattern to these differences by
either migrant status or sex.
More detailed tabulations (not shown here) reveal no discernible pat-
terns, either, by respondents' urban-rural residence, age, or schooling.
Whether or not they wanted a particular item, non-owning urban-dwellers
among the respondents were neither more nor less likely than their rural-
dwelling counterparts to have kin or friends with a supportive pattern of
ownership regarding that item. The same was true of younger versus older
non-owners, and of the less schooled versus the more schooled. If con-
sumption patterns among one's kin and friends can be presumed to have
some influence on one's own buying decisions, none of these categories
seems either particularly more or particularly less susceptible than the
others to this particular kind of peer pressure.
But these more detailed tabulations do lend credence to the proposi-
tion that the consumption patterns of their relatives and friends are likely to
offer greater support to non-owners for not wanting a particular item than
for wanting it. The proportion of cells in which all respondents had kin or
friends whose pattern of ownership regarding a particular item matched the
respondents' aspirations regarding that item (that is, owning, in the case of
those respondents who wanted the item; not owning, in the case of those
who did not want it) was, respectively for urban-rural residence, age, and
schooling, 39, 48, and 40% in the case of wanting, and 78, 85, and 90%
in the case of not wanting. Among the remaining cells—i.e., those in
which the ownership pattern of kin and friends does not conform com-
pletely to the respondents' aspirations—the median values point in the
same direction. Respectively for urban-rural residence, age, and schooling,
they were 44, 44, and 25% for those who wanted the items; and the nota-
bly higher 79, 78, and 67% for those who did not.
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TABLE 8
Percentages by Whether Own or Have Access to Selected
Manufactured Goods and by Whether Kin or Friends Own or Have
Access to Them: Respondents by Whether Those Without Them
Want These Goods, and by Migrant Status and Sex
a) Respondent has
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POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT
CONCLUSION
Turkey is a society in process of rapid social change. Among other
things, it is experiencing rapid urbanization, sizable increases in the num-
bers of automobiles and various other consumer items (with all the pres-
sures for changing lifestyles and values these bring with them), the rapid
extension of literacy, a marked expansion of the knowledge and practice of
birth control (including abortion) and a concomitant reduction in fertility.
To this can be added the growth (for whatever reasons) of Muslim funda-
mentalism and the political changes in consequence of the troubles with
Kurdish separatists.
One sees evidence of this process in the data adduced here on con-
sumption, as well as, in recent studies, in data relative both to religious
views and practices and to the status of women (see, e.g., Kadioglu, 1994;
Day & Icduygu, 1997; 1998). But only marginally are these consumption
data to any degree patterned in relation to such individual characteristics
as sex, age, residence, schooling, or migration experience in a way compa-
rable to the data pertaining to these other matters. To be sure, returned
migrants (presumably in consequence of a generally better financial posi-
tion) are generally more likely to own a particular consumer good. But this
is not invariably so, and if non-owners who want that particular item are
added to those who already own (or have access to) it, the differences by
migrant status are much reduced, if not eliminated altogether. So far as any
association with one or another individual characteristic is concerned, the
pattern of data on owning or wanting certain consumer items is essentially
one of inconsistency.
The relative lack of association between consumption aspirations and
migrant status appears, at first, to be something of a puzzle. One could
reasonably suppose that migration would play a major role in determining
consumption, especially when, as in the Turkish case, it involves such a
large proportion of the population and appears to be of a sort likely to
introduce its participants (whether directly or indirectly) to markedly differ-
ent consumer goods and lifestyles.
But there are many potential sources of such influence. It is, for exam-
ple, possible, with the near-ubiquity, now, of radio and television in Turkey,
that the Controls are not so lacking in contact with pressures to consume as
our three-part categorization by migrant status would imply. It is also possi-
ble, because consumer aspirations are relatively easily conceptualized and
relate to fairly concrete entities, that the volume of emigration has crossed
some kind of threshold respecting consumption that it has not yet crossed
respecting such other elements of life as values and patterns of belief—
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with the result that its influence is more pervasive relative to consumption
than it is relative to these other matters.
While there is little consistency in the association between consump-
tion and the various individual characteristics, there is within these catego-
ries a pattern of considerable consistency: namely, one of old interests per-
sisting alongside new. The possible role of peer pressure in maintaining
such a pattern is intriguing—especially given the fact that (to the extent it
exists) such pressure would appear to be stronger in opposition to con-
sumption than in support of it. What sustains this degree of neither owning
nor wanting among these people—low income? ignorance about what is
available for purchase? conservatism? simple preference? Perhaps all of
these, in some measure.
International migration can produce hope, response, intellectual stim-
ulation, joy, and happiness. It can also produce frustration, loneliness, sor-
row, and discontent. Whatever its other consequences, however, there can
be little doubt that the kind of international migration engaged in by Turks
over the last few decades—migration that has for the most part been tem-
porary and economically motivated, and that has consisted of movement
from relatively poor agricultural or but slightly industrialized areas to rich,
highly industrialized ones characterized by marked differences in lan-
guage, religion, and overall culture—has generally tended to improve the
strictly economic position in the home country of both the returned mi-
grants and, through remittances, those in their close kin and friendship
networks. Whether this economic improvement at the individual level is of
any lasting benefit to either the migrants and their networks or the societies
from which they come is at the least a debatable point. So much depends
on the length of time under consideration and the criteria employed.
Economic improvement is not necessarily to be equated with improve-
ment in other spheres. Do the non-owners/non-wanters have a greater ap-
preciation of this fact, or are they simply trimming their aspirations to suit
their purses? Whatever their evaluation of their own financial positions,
nearly everyone wanted a refrigerator and a washing machine. Yet three-
fourths of the 81 respondents in the present study who had not themselves
migrated but said that, because of the migration of a close relative, they
had bought things they would not otherwise have been able to buy re-
ported that these purchases had produced friction between themselves and
their neighbors, friends, or relatives. These are hardly the first people to
experience social cost in consequence of economic gain.
If non-consumption on the part of one's relatives and friends does, in
fact, provide some support for retention of a pattern of non-consumption, it
is unlikely to do so for long. For one thing, the Turkish population is chang-
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ing in the direction of greater concentrations in categories (urban and
higher-schooled, for instance) associated with higher consumption. Al-
though greater concentration at the older ages is an exception, any effect
this might have on consumption will be slow in coming and more than
likely offset by greater concentrations in the middle ages. In addition,
much of the social changes underway are in a direction that will not only
lock people into certain patterns of consumption but also make them de-
pendent upon the continuation and extension of these patterns. One sees
this, in particular, with the rapid decline in the proportion of the popula-
tion in farming and rural areas, and the corresponding expansion of the
urban population, and, in particular, of that portion of this population liv-
ing outside the urban centers—with all the encouragement to automobile
use and declining public transportation (and hence dependence on the
automobile) that this can be expected to give rise to. There can be no
doubt that migration is causally associated with some of these changes.
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